Attacking masked cryptographic implementations: Information-theoretic bounds - Télécom Paris Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2022

Attacking masked cryptographic implementations: Information-theoretic bounds


Measuring the information leakage is critical for evaluating the practical security of cryptographic devices against side-channel analysis. Information-theoretic measures can be used (along with Fano’s inequality) to derive upper bounds on the success rate of any possible attack in terms of the number of side-channel measurements. Equivalently, this gives lower bounds on the number of queries for a given success probability of attack. In this paper, we consider cryptographic implementations protected by (first-order) masking schemes, and derive several information-theoretic bounds on the efficiency of any (second- order) attack. The obtained bounds are generic in that they do not depend on a specific attack but only on the leakage and masking models, through the mutual information between side- channel measurements and the secret key. Numerical evaluations confirm that our bounds reflect the practical performance of optimal maximum likelihood attacks.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
202204chengliuguilleyrioul1.pdf (9.84 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-03718713 , version 1 (12-08-2022)


  • HAL Id : hal-03718713 , version 1


Wei Cheng, Yi Liu, Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Rioul. Attacking masked cryptographic implementations: Information-theoretic bounds. 2022 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2022), Jun 2022, Espoo, Finland. ⟨hal-03718713⟩
95 View
58 Download


Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More