

#### Maximizing the success of a side-channel attack

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#### ▶ To cite this version:

Annelie Heuser, Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Rioul. Maximizing the success of a side-channel attack. 3e colloque de l'Institut Mines-Télécom, Numérique: Grande échelle et complexité (Sécurité, sûreté, risques), Mar 2014, Paris, France. 2014. hal-02299999

#### HAL Id: hal-02299999 https://telecom-paris.hal.science/hal-02299999v1

Submitted on 20 Aug 2021

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# Maximizing the success of a side-channel attack

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
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Annelie Heuser is a recipient of the Google Europe Fellowship in Privacy.

# **State of the Art**

- What distinguishes known distinguishers, in terms of distinctive features?
- Given a side-channel context, what is the best distinguisher amongst all known ones?
- Distinguishers were chosen as (arbitrary) **statistical tools** (correlation, difference of means, linear regression, etc.)
- [1] highlights that proposed distinguishers behave equivalent when using the same leakage model, only "statistical artifacts" can explain different behavior [2]
- The estimation of the statistical tools (esp. mutual information) is very crucial and effective on the success [3]

# **Side-channel analysis as a communication problem [4]**



[1] Doget, Prouff, Rivain, and Standaert, JCEN, 2011 [2] Mangard, Oswald, and Standaert. IET, 2011 [3] Prouff and Rivain, IJACT, 2010. [4] Heuser, Rioul, and Guilley, under submission


## $\diamond$ Given a side-channel scenario, what is the best distinguisher, amongst all possible ones?

- Idea: Translate the problem of side-channel analysis into a problem of communication theory  $\rightarrow$  derive optimal distinguisher: maximize the success rate
- Leakage model is known to the attacker (Theorem 1)
  - Only statistical noise
  - Optimal decoding rule  $\arg \max_{k} \left( \mathbb{P}\{k\} \cdot p(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{y}(k)) \right)$ (template attack, profiling is possible)
  - The optimal distinguisher only depends on the noise distribution (e.g., Laplacian, uniform, Gaussian)
- Leakage model is partially unknown to the attacker (Theorem 2)
  - Statistical and epistemic noise
  - Leakage arises due to a weighted sum of bits, where the weights follow a normal distribution

### Theorem 1: optimal distinguisher when the leakage model is known


If the leakage arises from  $X = Y(k^{\star}) + N$  with known leakage model  $Y(k) = \varphi(f(k,T))$  then the optimal distinguishing rule are

- Gaussian noise distribution:  $\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,G}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_k \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k) \rangle \frac{1}{2} \| \mathbf{y}(k) \|_2^2$ , where  $\gamma = \frac{\sigma_{\alpha}^2}{\sigma^2}$  is the epistemic-to-stochastic-noise-ratio (ESNR).
- Uniform noise distribution:  $\mathcal{D}_{opt}^{M,U}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{t}) = \arg \max_k \|\mathbf{x} \mathbf{y}(k)\|_{\infty}$ ,



Theorem 2: optimal distinguisher when the leakage model is partially unknown Let  $\mathbf{Y}_{\alpha}(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \alpha_{j} [f(\mathbf{T}, k)]_{j}$ ,  $\mathbf{Y}_{j}(k) = [f(\mathbf{T}, k)]_{j}$  and  $\mathbf{X} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \alpha_{j} [f(T, k^{\star})]_{j} + N$ with  $N \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ . Assuming weights are independently deviating normally from the Hamming weight model, then the optimal distinguishing rule is

$$\mathcal{D}^{\alpha,G}(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{t}) = \arg\max_{k} \left( \gamma \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k) \rangle + \mathbf{1} \right)^{t} \cdot \left( \gamma Z(k) + I \right)^{-1} \cdot \left( \gamma \langle \mathbf{x} | \mathbf{y}(k) \rangle + \mathbf{1} \right)$$
$$- \sigma_{\alpha}^{2} \ln \det(\gamma Z(k) + I) ,$$



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