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▶ To cite this version:

Sylvain Guilley, Annelie Heuser, Martial Ren, Olivier Rioul, Simon Sellem. Success rate exponents for side-channel attacks. 16th Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2014), Sep 2014, Busan, South Korea. hal-02300002

HAL Id: hal-02300002 https://telecom-paris.hal.science/hal-02300002v1

Submitted on 20 Aug 2021

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Success Rate Exponents for Side-Channel Attacks

Sylvain GUILLEY Annelie HEUSER Martial REN Olivier RIOUL Simon SELLEM



Goal

- Compute the exact probability of success $\mathbb{P}_S = \mathbb{P}(\hat{K} = K^*)$
- Rigorous mathematical computation of its first order exponent of success rate:

 $\mathbb{P}_S \approx 1 - e^{-mE}$ for some *E*, where *m* is the number of measurements.

Useful concepts

(1)

 $(E = 10^{-3})$

Definition 1 (First-Order Exponent Equivalence). A sequence p_m of positive numbers admits a first-order exponent E_m if $\epsilon_m = E_m + \frac{1}{m} \ln p_m$ tends to zero as $m \longrightarrow +\infty$. In this case we write:

$$p_m \approx e^{-mE_m}$$
.

In practice, "
$$m = 20$$
" is already " $m \longrightarrow +\infty$ ".

Example (with E **independent of** m)

• By Eq. (1), if $\mathbb{P}_S = 90\%$, then $m = \frac{\ln(10)}{E}$;

• Doubling the number of measurements $m \rightarrow 2m \implies \mathbb{P}_S = 99\%$.



Side-channel analysis as a communication channel [HRG14]

Result for Gaussian noise

When $Y = \alpha X(k) + N$, with $N \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ is the noise:

$$E = \frac{1}{8\sigma^2} \min_{k \neq k'} \mathbb{E}(Y(k) - Y(k'))^2 \qquad (2)$$
$$= \frac{1}{2} \times SNR \times \min_{k \neq k'} \kappa_{k,k'} , \qquad (3)$$

• where $SNR = \frac{\alpha^2}{\sigma^2}$, and • where $\kappa_{k,k'} = \frac{1 - \rho(Y(k), Y(k'))}{2}$ is the confusion coefficient [FLD12].

Proof (for the optimal distinguisher when the noise is Gaussian, i.e., the opposite norm-2)

$$D_k^{\mathsf{opt}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) = -\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}(k)\|_2 \quad .$$
(4)

Nota bene: bold letters **x** *represent series:* $\mathbf{x} = (x_i)_{1 \le i \le m}$.

We define the marginal pairwise probability of failure:

 $\mathbb{P}_{k \to k' | \mathbf{t}} = \mathbb{P}(\|\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{Y}(k)\| \le \|\mathbf{X} - \mathbf{Y}(k')\| | \mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t}) .$ (5)

Lemma 1 (*Q*-expression of the Pairwise Failure Probability). Let $Q(x) = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{erf}\left(\frac{x}{\sqrt{2}}\right) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{x}^{+\infty} e^{-t^{2}/2} dt$ be the complementary cdf of a standard normal $\mathcal{N}(0, 1)$. We have:



$$\mathbb{P}_{k \to k' | \mathbf{t}} = Q\left(\frac{\|\mathbf{y}(k) - \mathbf{y}(k')\|}{2\sigma}\right) .$$

Lemma 2 (first-order Gaussian Q exponent). As $x \to +\infty$, $Q(x) \lesssim e^{-x^2/2}$, in the sense that $Q(x) \leq e^{-x^2/2}$ for all $x \geq 0$ and $\frac{\ln Q(x)}{x^2} \to -\frac{1}{2}$.

Dominated convergence theorem: $\mathbb{E}[\ln \mathbb{P}_{k \to k' | \mathbf{T}}/m] \longrightarrow -\frac{\mathbb{E}(Y(k) - Y(k'))^2}{8\sigma^2}$, when $m \longrightarrow +\infty$. Combining yields the result.

Relationship with the state-of-the-art

At CRYPTO '99 [CJRR99], Chari, Jutla, Rao and Rohatgi gave a lower bound on the probability of success of mono-bit side-channel attacks. The bound is exponential in the number of queries. Our results generalize the closed-form expressions of the success probability recently obtained in the case of normal noise when correlation is used as a distinguisher [FLD12, TPR13, DZFL14]. First order exponents are an alternative to the *relative distinguishing margin* (RDM [WO11]) because:

• they are completely related to the ideal criterion (namely, the success rate) for large (even moderately large) number of measurements m,

• they can be computed explicitly for many distinguishers to indicate how performance relates to noise power, model, etc. without resorting to experimentation.

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